Help for owners
Too many people are admins in our cloud account and nobody uses a second login step
Short answer
A cloud account where many people hold full admin rights and sign in with only a password can be emptied, run up a bill or be locked away from you with one stolen login. Turn on multi-factor sign-in first, then cut admin rights down to what each person needs. Do it in small, reversible steps so nothing stops working.
Does this sound like your situation?
- Several people, including former staff or agencies, can sign in to the cloud console with full admin rights.
- Signing in needs only a password.
- Developers share one login, or the access keys are pasted in chat.
- Nobody knows who owns the root account or which email it uses.
- I once saw a surprise charge or a resource I did not recognise.
Why does this happen?
Giving everyone admin is the quickest way to unblock a developer
When something fails with a permission error, the fastest fix is more rights. Over time the account fills with people who can do anything, and nobody takes the rights back.
Passwords alone are the weak point
AWS recommends requiring multi-factor authentication for users and for the root user, and prefers phishing-resistant methods such as passkeys and security keys where possible.
Confirmed by docs.aws.amazon.com
Least privilege is a deliberate choice
AWS describes least privilege as granting only the permissions required for a task, and says to regularly review and remove unused users, roles, permissions and credentials.
Confirmed by docs.aws.amazon.com
Long-lived keys outlive the people who made them
AWS recommends temporary credentials over long-term access keys where possible and says to update keys when needed, for example when an employee leaves. Keys that were pasted into code or chat are a separate risk.
Confirmed by docs.aws.amazon.comTechnical detail: An API key or .env file was committed to a Git repository
What can I do about it today?
- List who can sign inOpen the account's user list and write down every name, email and when it was last used. Do not delete anyone yet.
- Protect the top account firstMake sure the root or owner login uses a company email you control, a long unique password and multi-factor sign-in, and then do not use it for daily work.
- Ask everyone to turn on multi-factor sign-inSet a date, help people who struggle with it, and choose an authenticator app or security key.
- Mark who really needs adminFor each person, ask what they do in the console. Most need to see logs or deploy, not to change billing or delete things.
- Plan removals, do not rush themSwitching off a login that a running system secretly relies on can cause an outage. Disable first, wait and watch, and only then delete.
- Check the bill and recent changesOpen the billing page and look for services nobody recognises. If you find some, see the hacked cloud account page.
When should I bring someone in?
- You see charges or servers you did not create.
- You do not know which keys your live system depends on.
- A departed developer still has access and nobody can say what it reaches.
How do I handle it?
- Inventory firstUsers, roles, keys and what each one actually used recently, so removals are based on evidence.
- Fix sign-in before permissionsMulti-factor sign-in goes on first because it closes the biggest hole with the least risk of breaking anything.
- Shrink rights in stepsBroad admin is replaced by narrower roles one person and one system at a time, with a way back for each change.
- Move machines off long-term keysWhere possible, running services get temporary access instead of stored keys, and leftover keys are rotated.
- Write down the owner listA one-page note says who owns the account, who can recover it and when access is reviewed.
The price depends on what I find, so I quote in writing after a short discovery call. Tell me what is happening and I reply within 24 hours.
What do owners ask about this?
Will turning on MFA lock my team out?
It can if people lose their device. Keep recovery options and a second admin so one lost phone does not stop the account.
Can I just delete the old admin users?
Disable and watch first. A deleted user can break a script or system that quietly depended on it.
Does this apply to Google Cloud and Azure too?
The risk is the same in principle, but the exact settings differ, and I would read each provider's own documentation rather than assume.
Sources
How was this page made?
I drafted this page with AI assistance from the official documents listed under Sources. Found a mistake? Tell me.