Help for owners
Someone on my team clicked a phishing link and I do not know what happens next
Short answer
Treat it as a stolen login until proven otherwise. Have the person change that password from a clean device, sign them out everywhere, turn on multi-factor authentication, and check the mailbox for forwarding rules or sent mail they did not write. Report the message and tell your bank if payments were involved.
Does this sound like your situation?
- An employee says they clicked a link and typed their email password on a page that looked normal.
- Customers or suppliers are getting odd emails that appear to come from my staff.
- A supplier suddenly sent new bank details and someone already paid the invoice.
- Sent mail or inbox rules appeared that nobody on the team created.
- I do not know whether the business was hit or just got a bad email.
Why does this happen?
The fake page looks like the real login
CISA lists the usual warning signs: urgent language, requests for personal or financial information, shortened links and misspelled brand names in addresses. It also says good grammar no longer rules a message out, because AI can write flawless messages. A tired person on a busy day will miss it.
Confirmed by cisa.gov
A typed password is a copied password
If the login was entered on the fake site, the attacker now has it. CISA's own example describes a person who entered a login on a fake site and had a password and card details stolen. Whoever holds the password can open the mailbox and everything the account can reach.
Confirmed by cisa.gov
One password often opens several doors
The same password reused on accounting, file sharing or the website admin turns one slip into a wider problem. CISA names strong passwords, a password manager and multifactor authentication as the basics that help stop criminals from using stolen logins.
Confirmed by cisa.gov
The damage is quiet, not loud
A mailbox takeover rarely announces itself. The attacker can set a rule that hides replies, read invoices and then send a believable email asking a customer to pay into a different account. The first sign is often a customer asking why the bank details changed.
What can I do about it today?
- Do not punish, do ask exactly what happenedFind out which link, which page, what was typed and when. A person who fears blame hides details, and the details decide what has to be reset.
- Change the password from a different, clean deviceUse the real website typed into the address bar, not the link in the message. Change the password for that account first, and for any other account where the same password was used.
- Turn on multi-factor authenticationSwitch it on for email first, then accounting, file storage and the website admin. It is the single most useful step for the next incident.
- Sign the account out everywhere and look at the mailboxUse the email provider's option to sign out all sessions. Then look for forwarding addresses and rules you do not recognise, and for sent mail nobody wrote. Write down what you see rather than deleting it.
- Warn people who may have received mail from the accountTell customers and suppliers by phone or a separate channel to ignore anything odd from that address. If any payment was changed or sent, call your bank straight away.
- Report the message, then delete itCISA says to report the phish using the option near the sender, or the report spam button, and then delete it without replying or clicking any link. For serious incidents CISA takes reports at 1-844-729-2472, and IC3 is the FBI's hub for cyber-enabled crime.
When should I bring someone in?
- Money was paid or bank details were changed because of an email that came from your own domain or account.
- More than one account may have been affected, or the person had admin access to the website, hosting or payment systems.
- You cannot tell whether the attacker still has access after the password reset.
How do I handle it?
- Contain firstI list every account the person could reach and rotate access in order of risk: email, then money, then admin panels, then everything else.
- Read the evidence before changing itSign-in history, mailbox rules and sent items are copied out first, so you know what the attacker did and can answer customers truthfully.
- Close the quiet doorsForwarding rules, app permissions and leftover sessions are removed one at a time, and each step is checked again the next day.
- Check the website and appsI look at who has admin access to the site, hosting and code, and remove accounts that should not exist.
- Leave a short written recordA one-page note of what happened, what was changed and what to do next time, written for the owner and not for engineers.
The price depends on what I find, so I quote in writing after a short discovery call. Tell me what is happening and I reply within 24 hours.
What do owners ask about this?
Do I have to assume they stole data?
Assume the account was exposed until you can show it was not. Whether personal data is involved decides whether you have legal duties to report it, and that is a question for a lawyer or your regulator, not for me.
Is changing the password enough?
Not by itself. An attacker may have left a forwarding rule or an active session. Sign out all sessions and check the mailbox settings as well.
Should I call the police?
If money was lost, tell your bank first, then file a report. In the United States, IC3 is the FBI's central hub for cyber-enabled crime, and it says it does not work with outside parties to recover lost funds.
How do I stop it happening again?
Multi-factor authentication, a password manager and a simple habit of typing the website address instead of clicking, as CISA advises. No habit stops every phish.
Sources
How was this page made?
I drafted this page with AI assistance from the official documents listed under Sources. Found a mistake? Tell me.